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Saba Mahmood and Peter G. Danchin
Politics of Religious Freedom:
Contested Genealogies

Contemporary discourse on the right to reli-

gious liberty makes a number of claims but arguably none more insistent or polemical than its
claim to universality. Simultaneously invoking
notions of neutrality, secularity, freedom, and
right, the claim is somehow to have located an
Archimedean vantage point above or independent
of the contingencies and disorder of politics, culture, religion, and, indeed, of history itself. Much
critical scholarship in the history of ideas, however, has begun to question this reigning narrative to suggest that religious liberty is inescapably
context bound and inseparable from contingencies of politics, power, and history. This volume is
a contribution toward this growing scholarship.
The essays in this volume taken together track
multiple genealogies of the concept in a variety
of historical and contemporary contexts that cut
across the Western and non-Western divide. They
collectively show that religious liberty is not a single, stable principle existing outside of culture,
spatial geographies, or power relations but is a
fractious, polyvalent concept unfolding through
divergent histories in differing political orders.
The first two essays by Ian Hunter and Nehal
Bhuta take apart one of the common origin stories
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told about religious liberty in European history, namely, that it helped
establish the basis for political secularism by separating religion from politics and making the state indifferent to claims of religious truth. In this
view, since its initial formulation in seventeenth-century political thought,
religious liberty has continued progressively to expand its tolerant ambit to
all religions far beyond its initial mandate to institute peace across Christian denominations. In revisiting this narrative, Hunter argues that religious liberty in its earliest formulation in European history was in reality
an unsteady and unstable concept, the result of a “‘circumstantial casuistry’ of historically embedded political concepts” rather than a principled
commitment to the separation of church and state. Hunter thus points to
the deep incompatibility within and across three distinct historical conceptions of religious liberty: first, Martin Luther’s championing of the freedom
of all Christian believers in the sixteenth century against the Holy Roman
Empire’s rejection of this and its attack on the Religious Peace of Augsburg;
second, the Westphalian repudiation of the cuius regio, eius religio principle
at the heart of the earlier Augsburg settlement; and third, the conflict within
seventeenth-century political theory between John Locke’s conception of
religious toleration developed in the context of the Anglican settlement
and that advanced by Pufendorf and Thomasius writing in the context of
German imperial public law and the Brandenburg-Prussian settlement.
Given the historically contingent character of these rival understandings, the various philosophical attempts to ground religious liberty
in transcendent principles—whether in Catholic and Protestant scholasticisms, Lockean and Kantian rationalisms, or Taylorean philosophical
hermeneutics—have been unable to supersede the incompatibilities at the
heart of these conceptions since their early history. Hunter argues that
conflicts over religious freedom have been historically resolved, if at all, by
legal casuistry and the coercive imposition of judgments within regional
jurisdictions and national state-religion settlements. Hunter’s primary
claim, then, is that the intellectual history of religious freedom is to be
found not in philosophical foundations but in the horizon of “the religious,
political, and juridical casuistries spawned by the national religious settlements themselves.”
Crucial to the early historical unfolding of the concept of religious
liberty was the category of adiaphora, those religious activities that are
deemed unnecessary to salvation. According to Hunter, this category was
employed in the early modern period to “narrow the array of doctrine and
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liturgy where salvation was at stake, and to expand the array that could
be regarded as soteriologically indifferent, hence to be seen not from a
sacramental-religious standpoint but from a political-juridical one.” Once
these acts were made inconsequential to salvation, they could then be
brought under the regulation of civil law. Hunter concludes that long before
conceptions of subjective natural right or the inviolable autonomy of individual belief were ever on offer, early modern legal and political casuistries
created the bifurcated nature of the concept of religious liberty by seeking
to distinguish the essentially religious—“inner truths” toward which civil
authority claimed indifference—from the religiously permissible—which
were to be left free of sovereign interference except insofar as they threatened social peace.
For Bhuta, this early history is consequential for understanding the
contemporary formulation of religious liberty as encapsulated in Article 9
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in that it “represents a wordsmithed bricolage of rights-forms derived from heterogeneous
traditions and specific political projects.” In addition to this important trajectory in European history, Bhuta lays out two more that undergird the
current formulation of religious liberty: one emanating from the bourgeois
Rechtsstaat concept of legal right, which holds that any state intrusion on
individual liberty be calculable, definable, and controllable; and a second
from a Protestant conception of personal faith as the religious core that
ought to be protected from state intervention. Each of these genealogies
“coexist within the capacious language of freedom of conscience, submerging or reemerging in new ways to refract the contentious political conflicts
of the day,” suggests Bhuta.
We see all three of these genealogies at play in the textual structure
of the right itself. Article 9(1) protects an inviolable right of “everyone” to
“freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” while Article 9(2) subjects
the freedom to manifest religion or belief to certain grounds of limitation
where necessary, for example, to protect “public order” or “the rights of others.” Both this structure of the right and its interpretation by the European
Court rely on a distinction that significantly shapes the modern politics
of religious freedom. The first element in Article 9(1), known as the forum
internum, is defined as the locus of religious belief and conscience protected
absolutely by law while the second element in Article 9(2), known as the
forum externum, is where the outward expression of this belief is subject
to state regulation. (Note its consonance with the early modern distinction
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laid out by Hunter.) Integral to this formulation is the concept of public
order in the name of which the state accords itself the right to regulate and
intervene in the latter via either recognition or limitation of manifestations
of religious belief.
The conceptual architecture of the right is in this respect premised
on a paradox. On the one hand, it is said to be neutral toward specific religious beliefs, and indeed neutrality is the leitmotif of modern religious liberty discourse whether in moral, legal, or political contexts. On the other
hand, the right to religious freedom, as a technology of modern state and
international legal governance, is deeply implicated in the regulation of religion. This tension between inviolability and regulation is internal to the concept of religious liberty itself and serves to generate the distinctive antinomies and contradictions that arise in struggles over its meaning, justification,
and realization.
Given this conceptual structure, it is hardly surprising that the legal
reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting Article 9
embeds and entangles these long-standing conceptual conundrums. For
Bhuta, this is strikingly evident in the recent jurisprudence of the court on
the headscarf in that it accords the state a wide margin of appreciation in the
name of upholding public order, which itself is grounded in the majoritarian
Christian values and sensibilities. These decisions taken together, he argues,
represent a “moral-cultural political theology of democracy as transvalued
Christianity” while imposing limitations on the public expression of rival
religious commitments.
Importantly, this conception of religious liberty and its attendant
antinomies are operative not only in the jurisprudence of the ECHR but
also of courts in Egypt and India as analyzed in both our contribution and
Ratna Kapur’s. In each context, the relationship between religion and state is
distinct: in some cases (Egypt) the religious personality of the state is pronounced whereas in others (India and Italy) it is more muted, and in Europe
(France and Britain) it is distinctly secular. This dissimilarity between levels
of secularity would make any comparison impossible for most scholars of
religious liberty. Yet as is evident in the analysis offered of case law from
Europe, Egypt, and India, there are remarkable similarities in the structure
of the legal arguments deployed. In all the cases examined, the courts have
simultaneously upheld the individual’s right to belief while sanctioning the
public display of these beliefs, especially of religious minorities. As our contributors show, what is shared in these judgments is the deployment of the
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concept of public order in order to secure the state’s right to intervene and
regulate the religious practices of its citizens. Thus the French and other
European states’ ban on the veil are premised on this argument, as is the
regulation of the right of the Bahais to proclaim their faith publicly in Egypt
and the Indian court’s rejection of the Muslim minority’s claim to worship
in the contested site of Ayodhya. In all of these cases, the prerogative of the
state is predicated on the prior distinction between forum internum and
forum externum that essentially allows the state simultaneously to uphold the
immunity and sanctity of religious belief even as it regulates the manifestation of these beliefs.
As we argue in our contribution to this volume, “Immunity or Regulation? Antinomies of Religious Freedom,” this inevitably involves the state in
making substantive arguments and claims about what is essential or inessential to the domain of religious belief (e.g., is the veil an essential part of
Islam or simply a cultural accretion?), which is a violation of the state’s claim
to abstain from intervention in the religious domain. Rather than read this
contradiction as a corruption of the right to religious liberty, we want to suggest that this antinomy is internal to the conceptual architecture of the right
itself. The strikingly parallel legal arguments invoked in a variety of contexts, with distinctly different models of religion-state ententes, makes this
evident. Viewed from this perspective, we conclude that the right to religious
liberty is not simply a legal instrument that protects the sanctity of religious
belief but also a technology of modern governance that ensures the state’s
sovereign right to regulate all domains of social life, a necessary part of
which is religion.
An important theme that emerges from the articles here is how the
legal concept of public order privileges the beliefs, values, and practices
of the majority religious tradition in any given polity. We see this in the
Ayodhya case in India, the Bahai case in Egypt, the Jehovah Witness case in
Greece, the Şahin case in Turkey, the Lautsi case in Italy, and the Dogru case
in France. Some contributors to this volume (Samuel Moyn and Kapur) view
this propensity in the jurisprudence of the right to belie its claim to secular
neutrality. Other contributors (Mahmood and Danchin) see this propensity
as diagnostic of the necessary intertwining between the religious and the
secular that characterizes all modern polities despite different models of
state-religion entente that prevail in a particular polity. “Immunity or Regulation?,” for instance, argues that insomuch as the disciplinary powers of the
modern state extend over all of social life, the secular state is necessarily
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involved in regulating the social life of religion and often prescribing substantive content while at the same time claiming to treat all of its citizens
equally regardless of their religious commitments. This dual impetus internal to secular governmentality is evident in the two parts of the right to
religious liberty discussed above: the first that enshrines religious belief
as an inner sanctum protected from state intervention, and the second that
authorizes the state to sanction and regulate the public expression of religious beliefs. The former promises civil and political equality across lines of
religious difference, and the latter lodges majoritarian values and sensibilities in the very substance of a nation’s laws. If indeed this tension is internal
to the right to religious liberty, and the modern secular state more broadly,
then, as the essay concludes, religious intolerance cannot be understood simply as a product of cultural, religious, or social values but requires that we
attend to the operation of modern secular power in generating new forms of
religious prejudice and enhancing old ones.
There is another important consequence that follows from the conceptualization of the right to religious liberty as a technology of modern governance, namely its role in settling and generating geopolitical conflicts. This
dimension of religious liberty comes to the fore most forcefully in the contributions by Moyn and Melani McAlister. Importantly, Moyn shows how the
concept of religious liberty, far from being a secular instrument, served as a
weapon during the Cold War against “godless communism” in American
and European diplomacy. In this formulation, religious freedom was not a
religious concept but a Christian one deployed in “the holy crusade against
[Soviet] secularism.” American and European Christian activists played a
key role in shaping Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
at the end of the Second World War, suffusing it with a “Christian personalist” ethos that persists in the right’s enshrinement of conscience (over other
aspects of religion) to this day. Moyn echoes Hunter and Bhuta in concluding that the definition of the right to religious liberty has changed depending on the political context in which it is inserted and the national security
interests it is made to serve. It is not surprising therefore that when its target
was godless communism during the Cold War, it had a Christian cast, and
now that the target is Islam in Euro-American states, religious liberty has
come to be cast as a secular principle. The targets of religious liberty may
have changed (from communists to Muslims) but its rationale as an instrument of raison d’état continues to be evident.
If Moyn’s focus is on Cold War geopolitics as a decisive factor in the
development of the concept of religious liberty in international law, then
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McAlister’s essay provides a different geopolitical arc that cuts across the
divide between the North and the global South. It concerns the rearticulation of the Christian evangelical movement in America, which, following
the end of the Cold War, came to focus its energies on Islam as the new
enemy of Christendom globally. Their most notable success was the passage of the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) by the US Congress
in 1998, which charges the US State Department to monitor and sanction
infractions of religious liberty globally, especially when the victims are Christians and the perpetrators Muslims. McAlister follows the unfolding of this
ambitious project in Southern Sudan where American evangelicals mobilized on behalf of Sudanese Christians, making wide use of IRFA and in the
process deploying a uniquely American vision of religious liberty and racial
politics. While the persecution of Southern Christians was quite ferocious
by the North Sudanese government, in saving these persecuted souls, the
American evangelicals (blacks and whites) projected their own imaginary
of race, redemption, and slavery onto the Sudanese, indelibly transforming
the self-understanding of the local players and the racial topography of race
and religion. The American conception of race was anachronous to the Sudanese reality, but it became widely adopted as the civil war raged on and the
American evangelical activism gave it a new grid of intelligibility. McAlister’s essay powerfully shows that the right to religious liberty is not simply
a neutral instrument that protects persecuted populations but is also enormously productive and transformative of religious identity, often hardening
existing lines of religious difference and transforming religious conflicts
into racial ones by infusing local politics with new meaning.
In conclusion, the essays in this volume provide an account of the
right to religious liberty in which the power differential between religious
majority and minority within a polity, between the North and South, between
the state and its subjects, provides a different interpretive grid for its conceptual and practical understanding. A basic argument that runs through
these articles is that far from being an instrument of neutrality that protects
religion or its practitioners, the right to religious liberty also helps create new
identities, reifies religious difference, furthers state regulation of religious
life, and at times facilitates the hegemony of powerful geopolitical actors.
By highlighting these aspects of religious liberty, our aim is not to condemn it but to bring our attention to the performative and productive capacity
of this putatively neutral legal instrument to generate new political polarizations. Once we recognize that religious liberty is not universal but necessarily
context bound, and that the secular and the religious are not in fact opposites
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but closely intertwined in paradigmatic ways in all nation-states, then we
might be able to appreciate how the right to religious liberty is not a safeguard
against state coercion and religious intolerance but at times their vehicle. The
challenge we are left with is a political problem: how to conceive and institute
the pragmatics of religious liberty in ways that do not reify the categories and
operations of the Leviathan and its regulatory powers.
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